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As defined by leading practitioners like Mircea Eliade, the history 
of religions, like the phenomenology of religion, purports only to 
describe, not to endorse, the believer's view of the origin, function, 
and meaning of religion. I argue that historians, whether or not 
phenomenologists, in fact commit themselves to endorsing the believer's 
view. 
Take, as representative, the position of Eliade. According to 
him, religion originates and functions to link human beings to the 
"sacred" - an impersonal realm beyond individual gods. Human beings 
seek to encounter the sacred both temporally and spatially. They 
long to experience both the places where the sacred has manifested 
itself - for example, a particular stone or tree - and the pre-fallen, 
Edenic epoch when the gods, who are agents of the sacred, were near: 
since religious man cannot live except in an 
atmosphere impregnated with the sacred, we must expect 
to find a large number of techniques for consecrating 
space .... Religious man's desire to live in the sacred 
is in fact equivalent to his desire ... to live in a real 
and effective world, and not in an illusion.! 
It is easy to understand why the memory of that marvelous 
time haunted religious man, why he periodically sought 
to return to it. In illo tempore the gods had displayed 
their greatest powers. The cosmogony is the supreme 
divine manifestation, the paradigmatic act of strength, 
superabundance, and creativity. Religious man ... seeks 
to reside at the very source of primordial reality, when 
the world was in statu nascendi. 2 
Human beings, says Eliade, yearn to experience the sacred not 
as the means to an end but as the end itself. They seek the sacred 
because they seek the sacred, not because they seek something else 
through it. Security and peace of mind are among the many happy 
consequences of contact with the sacred, but contact itself remains 
the end. Human beings, for Eliade, not merely want but need contact 
with the sacred: " ... religious man can live only in a sacred world, 
because it is only in such a world that he participates in being, that 
he has a real existence. This religious need expresses an unquenchable 
ontological thirst. Religious man thirsts for being".3 In saying 
continually that man is homo re!igiosus, Eliade is saying that contact 
with the sacred is man's essential need. 
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In saying that religion serves to manifest the sacred, Eliade 
invariably professes to be merely presenting the believer's own view 
of religion: 
A sacred stone remains a stone; apparently (or, more 
precisely, from the profane point of view), nothing 
distinguishes it from all other stones. But for those to 
whom a stone reveals itself as sacred, its immediate reality 
is transmuted into a supernatural reality. In other words, 
for those who have a religious experience all nature is 
capable of revealing itself as cosmic sacrality.4 
Eliade laments, for example, that "the main interest" of Westerners 
who study primitives 
. . . has been the study of material cultures and the 
analysis of family structure, social organization, tribal 
law, and so on. These are problems, one may say, important 
and even urgent for western scholarship, but of secondary 
importance for the understanding of the meaning of a 
particular culture, as it was understood and assumed by 
its own members. 5 
As a historian of religions, Eliade claims to be seeking no more 
than the believer's point of view: "The ultimate aim of the historian 
of religions is to understand, and to make understandable to others, 
religious man's behavior and mental universe".6 In contrast to the 
theologian, from whom he regularly distinguishes himself, Eliade 
the historian never strays from empirical evidence, which presumably 
means the reports and observations of believers themselves: 
The procedure of the historian of religions is just as 
different from that of the theologian. All thology implies 
a systematic reflection on the content of religious 
experience, aiming at a deeper and clearer understanding 
of the relationships between God-Creator and man-creature. 
But the historian of religions uses an empirical method 
of approach. He is concerned with religio-historical facts 
which he seeks to understand and to make intelligible 
to others.7 
The issue at hand is not whether Eliade accurately presents 
the believer's point of view. Assume that he does. The issue is whether 
he is merely describing or outright endorsing that point of view. 
I argue that Eliade outright endorses the believer's view.S To 
begin with, Eliade argues ·that believers are often unconscious of 
the full meaning of religion for them. As he says of religious symbols 
in particular: 
. . • we do not have the right to conclude that the message 
of the symbols is confined to the meanings of which a 
certain number of individuals are fully conscious, even 
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when we learn from a rigorous investigation of these 
individuals what they think of such and such a symbol 
belonging to their own tradition. Depth psychology has 
taught us that the symbol delivers its message and fulfils 
its function even when its meaning escapes a wareness.9 
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In imputing to believers a meaning of which they are considerably 
unconscious, Eliade is surely venturing beyond mere description. 
Even more striking, Eliade argues that nonbelievers, whom 
he equates with moderns, are unconsciously religious: 
... nonreligious man in the pure state is a comparatively 
rare phenomenon, even in the most [consciously] 
desacralized of modern societies. The majority of the 
'irreligious' still behave religiously, even though they are 
not aware of the fact •... [T]he modern man who feels 
and claims that he is nonreligious still retains a large 
stock of camouflaged myths and degenerated ri tuals.lO 
Eliade goes so far as to say that "even the most avowedly nonreligious 
man still, in his deeper being, shares in a religiously oriented 
behavior".ll In attributing to nonbelievers a religiosity of which they 
are not just partly but wholly unconscious and which not just exceeds 
but contradicts their self-professed atheism, Eliade is surely venturing 
far beyond mere description. 
Most important, Eliade pits his would-be mere description of 
religion against the outright explanations of social scientists, whom 
he faults for explaining religion reductively rather than irreducibly 
religiously: 
a religious phenomenon will only be recognized as 
such if it is grasped at its own level, that is to say, if 
it is studied as something religious. To try to grasp the 
essence of such a phenomenon by means of physiology, 
psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, art or any 
other study is false; it misses the one unique and irreducible 
element in it - the element of the sacred.l2 
If Eliade intends to be only describing religion, he cannot consistently 
oppose that who intend to be explaining it, reductively or not. His 
social scientific antagonists would surely grant that a description, 
which a ims at only presenting the believer's point of view, must be 
nonreducti ve. They would simply deny that an explanation must be.l3 
In order to oppose them Eliade must himself be not merely describing 
religion but explaining i t - nonreductively. 
Ordinar ily, the social sciences seek to explain only the origin, 
function, and meaning of religion, not its object. They seek to 
determine why believers, believe, not whether what believers believe 
is true. In opposing social scienti fic explanations, Eliade is t hereby 
commit ted to an irreducibly religious view - the believer's presumed 
view - of only t he origin, function, and meaning of religion. 
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I argue that Eliade is in fact thereby committed to the believer's 
view of the object, or referent, of religion as well. I argue that he 
is committed to the reality of the sacred itself, not just of the human 
need for it. In an earlier essay I argued that Eliade's endorsement 
of the believer's view of the meaning, or significance, of religion 
itself commits him to the reality of the sacred. For the heart of the 
meaning of religion for believers is the reality of the saered. Now 
I want to argue, more concretely, that Eliade's endorsement of the 
believer's view of the function of religion commits him to the reality 
of the sacred. For if, according to Eliade, the function of religion 
for believers is to reach the sacred, its fulfilment requires the existence 
of the sacred. By contrast, the origin of religion - the existence 
of a need for the sacred - does not itself entail the existence of 
the sacred. 
In saying that the function of religion for believers is to reach 
the sacred, Eliade may, to be sure, be saying only that religion is 
intended to reach the sacred, not that it necessarily does. Only if 
he is saying that religion for believers actually functions to reach 
the sacred is he committed to the reality of the sacred. 
The proof that religion, for Eliade, functions to reach the sacred 
stems not just from his endorsement of the believer's presumed view 
that it does - why else would the believer continue to be religious? -
but also from Eliade's own claim that it does. Eliade's relentless praise 
of religion suggests strongly that, for him, it actually works. Why 
else would he laud it so effusively? Since the need for the sacred 
that he says all humans feel is, for him, both innate and, except for 
moderns, conscious, he cannot be crediting religion with either 
implanting that need or, insofar as the need remains unconscious 
in moderns, even awakening it. He must, then, be crediting religion 
with fulfilling it. 
Indeed, Eliade declares outright that religion accomplishes 
its function. As he says of myth in particular: 
He who recites or performs the origin myth is thereby 
steeped in the sacred atmosphere in which these miraculous 
events took place •.•. As a summary formula we might 
say that by 'living' the myths one emerges from profane, 
chronological time and enters a time that is of a different 
quality, a 'sacred' Time at once primordial and indefinitely 
recoverable.l4 
In fact, Eliade says that even modern, seemingly secular myths, which 
he considers less potent than earlier, explicitly religious ones, still 
work: 
A whole volume could well be written on the myths of 
modern man, on the mythologies camouflaged in the plays 
that he enjoys, in the books that he reads. . . . Even 
reading includes a mythological . function . . . because, 
through reading, the modern man succeeds in obtaining 
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an 'escape from time' comparable to the 'emergence from 
time' effected by [earlier] myths. Whether modern man 
'kills' time with a detective story or enters such a foreign 
temporal universe as is represented by any novel, reading 
projects him out of his personal duration and incorporates 
him into other rhythms, makes him live in another 
'history•.l5 
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Surely Eliade is saying here that religion, as represented by myth, 
works in fact, not just in the believer's mind. 
To be sure, Eliade is committed to the reality of the sacred 
only if he is committed to the reality of the need for it and of the 
fulfilment of that need. If Eliade is saying not that believers really 
need the sacred but only that they think they do, religion could succeed 
not by actually linking them to the sacred but only by convincing 
them that it had. Eliade could even be saying that the need religion 
fulfils is the need to think that one has reached the sacred. 
Nowhere, however, does Eliade characterize the need religion 
fulfils as less than a need actually to reach the sacred. For example 
he writes, as quoted, of "religious man's desire to live in the sacred",16 
not just to think that he has. 
What is true of Eliade is, I believe, true of other historians 
of religions as well. They profess to be only conveying the believer's 
point of view, but in fact they are therefore necessarily endorsing 
it. They are therefore necessarily believers themselves. 
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